client.realtime.connect().
Why client tokens
- Safe to send to browsers and mobile apps
- Short-lived (configurable TTL, 1–3600 seconds, default 60s)
- Optional model scoping (restrict which models the key can access)
- Optional origin scoping (restrict which web origins can use the key — browser-enforced)
- Limited scope (cannot create new tokens)
- Expiration blocks new connections, but does not disconnect active realtime sessions
End-to-end flow
1
Create token on your backend
Your backend uses your permanent API key to create a client token.
2
Return token to the frontend
Return
apiKey and expiresAt from your backend endpoint.3
Connect with the client token
Your frontend uses the token as
apiKey when connecting to realtime.Options
All options are optional. Without options, tokens use a 60-second TTL and are unrestricted.
Constraints object:
expiresIn vs maxSessionDuration — these control different things.
expiresIn sets how long the token can be used to start new connections. Once a realtime session is established, the token’s expiration does not terminate it.
maxSessionDuration caps how long an individual realtime session can remain active, regardless of token expiration.
Use both together for full control: e.g. a 5-minute token window with a 2-minute max per session.Model scoping
PassallowedModels to restrict which models a token can be used with. The bouncer verifies model permissions when the client connects — if the model isn’t in the allowed list, the connection is rejected.
Tokens created without allowedModels are unrestricted and work with any model.
Origin scoping
PassallowedOrigins to pin a token to a specific list of web origins. When the token is later used to open a realtime session, the connection is accepted only if the browser-issued WebSocket Origin header matches one of the listed origins. Mismatched or missing origins are rejected with close code 1008 and {"type":"error","error":"Origin not allowed"}.
Each entry must be a canonical origin so it compares byte-for-byte to what browsers send. The mint endpoint enforces this and returns a 400 (with the canonical form in the message) when input doesn’t match:
- scheme
http://orhttps:// - lowercase scheme and host
- no trailing slash, path, query, or fragment
- no userinfo (credentials)
- no default port (
:443for https,:80for http) - max 253 chars per entry, max 20 entries per token
Tokens created without
allowedOrigins are unrestricted (no origin enforcement).
Defense-in-depth, not hermetic. Origin enforcement is browser-driven: it materially raises the cost of stolen-token replay from a different web origin, but does not protect against an attacker who controls a non-browser HTTP client and can spoof the
Origin header. Treat it as one layer alongside short TTLs and model scoping, not a sole boundary.Backend examples
Frontend example
Rotation strategy
- Create tokens on demand when users open a realtime session
- Use shorter TTLs (e.g. 60s) for tighter security; use longer TTLs (e.g. 300–600s) when refresh overhead matters
- Refresh token before starting a new session if the old token is near expiry
- Do not persist client tokens in local storage
- Revoke permanent keys in dashboard if you suspect leakage